Archive for the ‘Bubbles (Asset)’ Category

A Note On Asset Bubbles

Monday, January 30th, 2012

I would like to highlight the topic of asset bubbles and the numerous past posts I have written concerning them.  This topic is particularly apropos given that my analysis indicates that various asset bubbles are very “mature,” i.e. very close to ending or “popping.”   As well, I have been writing of my analysis concerning the building financial danger in the financial system, which also poses a grave danger to the sustenance of these asset bubbles. Among these mature asset bubbles are those in both the stock and bond markets.

There are two aspects of asset bubbles that are of great importance.  The first is the impact such bubbles have on investors.  The second is what impact these bubbles have on the overall economy.

It should be noted that asset bubbles are often widely seen as attractive and/or beneficial during their expansion phase.  For instance, during the housing bubble, few people were wary of the “bubble” trend; in fact, the vast majority – including professional economists and policy makers – thought such price appreciation was “great” (i.e. highly beneficial), and such appreciation was “natural” as opposed to constituting a “bubble.”  The vast majority also believed such house price appreciation would last indefinitely, with few risks posed.  Exceedingly few (especially on a percentage basis) predicted the “top” of the bubble or the economic ramifications of its aftermath.

My analysis continues to indicate that the peril presented by the current asset bubbles can’t be overstated.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 1314.53 as this post is written

Share

The Bond Bubble – Update

Monday, August 15th, 2011

In previous posts I have discussed the Bond Bubble and its many facets.  In particular, I would like to highlight my post of October 4 2010, “Thoughts On The Bond Bubble.”

During the recent market tumult, bond yields have once again dropped sharply to very low levels, as seen by the yield on the 10-Year Treasury.  A couple of charts illustrate this.  First, a weekly long-term chart from 1962 as seen in Doug Short’s August 12 blog post titled “Treasury Yields in Perspective“, with 10-Year Treasury Yields shown in blue:

(click on chart to enlarge image)

-

Next, a 3-year daily chart of the 10-Year Treasury Yield:

(click on chart to enlarge image)(chart courtesy of StockCharts.com)

-

While this Bond Bubble may have a little more “upside” left to it, I am of the belief that attempting to derive gains from bonds at this point is akin to “picking up pennies in front of a steamroller” – i.e. there is little to be gained, and much to be lost.

While the Bond Bubble continues, its risks to investors, financial markets and the economy in general has in no way diminished.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 1194.20 as this post is written

Share

Janet Yellin’s Speech of June 2 2011 – Notable Excerpts

Thursday, June 9th, 2011

On June 2, Janet Yellin, Vice Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, gave a speech titled “Assessing Potential Financial Imbalances in an Era of Accomodative Monetary Policy” (pdf)

While I don’t agree with many of her points and assertions, I nonetheless think the topic is very important.  As such, here are a few excerpts that I think are notable:

page 1 :

Monetary policy in the United States has been highly accommodative now for a number of years.  Since late 2008, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has kept the target federal funds rate close to zero and has purchased a substantial amount of longer-term Treasury and agency securities.  My reading of the evidence is that those securities purchases have proven effective in easing financial conditions, thereby promoting a stronger pace of economic recovery and checking undesirable disinflationary pressures.  Moreover, I believe that the current accommodative stance of U.S. monetary policy continues to be appropriate because the unemployment rate remains elevated and inflation is expected to remain subdued over the medium run.

page 2:

In the aftermath of the crisis, the primary objective of U.S. monetary policy was to promote financial conditions likely to spur spending on goods and services through a number of channels.  To this end, the Federal Reserve first lowered the federal funds rate and other rates at the short end of the yield curve and, once the zero lower bound was binding, sought to push down yields at the longer end through large-scale purchases of longer-term Treasury and agency securities.  We anticipated that lowering rates on these securities would place downward pressure on a range of private yields as well, in turn supporting home values, equity prices, and other asset prices.  After all, this is the primary mechanism through which monetary policy in its conventional form stimulates the economy.  But a sustained period of very low and stable yields may incent a phenomenon commonly referred to as “reaching for yield,” in which investors seek higher returns by purchasing assets with greater duration or increased credit risk.

page 4:

Misaligned asset prices are notoriously difficult to detect in a timely fashion, and no single metric or set of metrics can consistently and reliably identify stretched valuations.  Nonetheless, it is clearly worthwhile to track a wide range of metrics and to view them in the context of their historical norms.  Current conditions can be evaluated against a baseline of past experience, and then assessed in light of the various institutional and market factors that could conceivably account for deviations from historical ranges.  The Federal Reserve tracks a large number of indicators, and I will highlight a few examples.  Overall, these indicators do not obviously point to significant excesses or imbalances in the United States.

page 8:

Therefore, the risk of a rapid and disorderly deleveraging in the event of a swift change in market sentiment seems to be limited at this point.

page 8:

First, important classes of generally unlevered investors (for example, pension funds) are reportedly finding it difficult in the present low interest rate environment to meet nominal return targets and may be reaching for yield by assuming greater interest-rate and credit risk in their portfolios.

page 10:

If substantial evidence of financial imbalances on a broader scale were to develop, particularly if accompanied by significant use of leverage, I believe that supervision and regulation should constitute our first line of defense.  Indeed, in the wake of the crisis, our supervisory process has been significantly modified to take more explicitly into account possible financial stability implications and effects on the broader economy, a perspective that is frequently described as “macroprudential.”  Our concerns now extend beyond the capacity of individual institutions to protect their capital and balance sheets.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 1279.56 as this post is written

Share

The Groupon & LinkedIn IPOs – Broader Significance

Wednesday, June 8th, 2011

On March 1 I wrote a post titled “The Stock Market Bubble – Various Aspects.”

In that post I highlighted a variety of factors that support my conclusion that the entire stock market is experiencing a bubble.

One of the factors listed was “Extremely rapid valuation increases seen in a variety of private (tech) companies to high valuations, despite any clear indication that fundamentals have changed proportionately.”

Since the writing of that post, we have had one very notable IPO, LinkedIn, as well as another pending IPO, Groupon, that serve to illustrate that point.  What is notable in many of the private tech companies’ valuations includes the current size of the valuations; the size of the valuation increases; and the rates at which the valuations are increasing.  All three of these aspects are (very much) outsized.

LinkedIn’s first day of trading, May 19, likely reminded some of the type of manic price action seen during tech IPOs of the late ’90s.  Here is the chart from May 19 in 1-minute increments:

(click on chart to enlarge image)(chart courtesy of StockCharts.com)

As seen in Barron’s, May 23, in an article titled “Is LinkedIn Already Tapped Out?” at a price of $93 the Market Capitalization was $8.7 Billion and 2010 Revenue was $243 million, with 2010 Profits of $15 million.  As seen in the article, “Twenty-seven months ago, LinkedIn was issuing options with an exercise price of just $2.32 – less than 1/40th of what investors paid last week.”

The Groupon jump in valuation is starkly illustrated by the following, as seen in a Wall Street Journal June 3 article titled “Groupon to Gauge Limits of IPO Mania.” From that article: “As of March 31, Groupon’s shares traded among institutional investors in private secondary trading at an implied valuation of $5.6 billion, according to Nyppex LLC, an intermediary in the secondary market.”

While Groupon has yet to go public, various sources have been predicting a resulting post-IPO Market Capitalization in the $20-$30 Billion range.  One revenue projection indicated 2011 revenue of $2.6 Billion.

I could write extensively about my thoughts concerning the fundamentals of both LinkedIn and Groupon; for now I will highlight one item (among many) that deserves particular attention – that of the outsized Price-To-Sales ratios.

Of course, there are many other private tech companies experiencing similar dynamics.  In aggregate, these huge, fast jumps in valuations – to (very) high valuations – should serve as a “red flag” that there is wildly excessive positive sentiment.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 1283.31 as this post is written

Share

Housing Prices – The Continual “Bottom” Calls

Tuesday, April 12th, 2011

On April 7, the CalculatedRisk.com blog had a post titled “House Prices: Nominal, Real, Price-to-Rent.” The following chart is from that post, and it shows the historical price trends of both the Case-Shiller (Composite 20 Index as well as the National Index) and the CoreLogic indices:

(click on chart to enlarge image)

-

My comments:

From the above chart, one can see why, especially both before and during the “bubble years,” there was a widely-held perception that “house prices never decline.”

Many people currently believe that either the “bottom is in” with regard to prices or such a “bottom” is close at hand.  One can see this among the consensus in the MacroMarkets March 2011 Home Price Expectations Survey, as well as various other sources.

While many can cite various statistics and valuation measures justifying their beliefs that “real estate has bottomed” at these levels, since the peak there have been many of these incorrect proclamations and analyses.

I believe that the continual decline in residential real estate is, in part, a testament to how “tricky” predicting asset bubbles can be.

I have written extensively about the residential real estate situation.  For a variety of reasons, it is exceedingly complex.  While at this time, as aforementioned, many people have an optimistic view regarding future residential real estate prices, I continue to believe that such a view is unsupported on an “all things considered” basis.  Furthermore, there exists outsized potential for a price decline of severe magnitude, unfortunately.  I discussed this downside, based upon historical price activity, in the October 24, 2010 post.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 1324.46 as this post is written

Share

The Stock Market – Two Other Notes

Thursday, March 3rd, 2011

There are two other aspects I would like to highlight with regard to the stock market.

First, per my last two posts, my analysis indicates the entire stock market is currently a bubble.   Given that conclusion, as well as my opinion that there are various other asset bubbles in existence right now, I would like to highlight a post I wrote on May 27, 2010 titled “Bubble Investing.”

Second, I view the stock market as exhibiting characteristics of a “crowded trade.”  I recently wrote of this condition on February 28 in “The Stock Market as a ‘Crowded Trade’.”

A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here
SPX at 1308.44 as this post is written

 

Share

The Stock Market Bubble – Various Aspects

Tuesday, March 1st, 2011

(This post is made in conjunction with the last post, “The Stock Market Bubble – General Comments“)

There are various aspects of the stock market that lead me to conclude that the stock market is experiencing a bubble.

First, for reference purposes, here is a 1-year daily chart of the S&P500 updated through February 28, 2011:

(click on chart to enlarge)(chart courtesy of StockCharts.com)

Here is a list of various general areas that, in total, I believe support the conclusion that the stock market is a bubble :

  • Exceedingly strong price action; by many measures this rally is among – if not – the strongest in history
    • This is seen in the price chart of the S&P500 – as well as many individual stocks – as an increasingly “parabolic” trajectory, especially viewed from September 2010 to present
  • A high degree of “froth” – Although difficult to prove, “froth” is often seen during the terminal stages of asset bubbles
  • Excessively high sentiment – Among established, quantifiable sentiment measures, this stock market has been displaying prolonged periods of excessive sentiment readings
  • Extremely rapid valuation increases seen in a variety of private (tech) companies to high valuations, despite any clear indication that fundamentals have changed proportionately
  • The stock market seems to have the “feel” of a self-feeding mania, which was seen in other recent bubbles such as the NASDAQ and Internet bubbles of the late-90s, as well as the housing bubble
  • Proprietary measures that I keep that show vast overvaluation
  • A general attitude of “nothing bad can happen” – often the low interest rate environment and strong intervention policies such as QE2 are quoted as “guarantees” precluding any substantial adversity

I have repeatedly stated, since my June 2, 2010 post, that I believe the stock market will continue to rise despite highly problematical future conditions in both the stock market and overall economy.  While I still think it will continue to rise, at this point I feel that it is becoming an increasingly (very) high-risk proposition to hold long equity positions.  This is especially so given my certainty that there will be an exceedingly large stock market “crash” in the future, of which I have previously commented upon.

A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here
SPX at 1327.22 as this post is written

Share

The Stock Market Bubble – General Comments

Monday, February 28th, 2011

In the February 11, 2011 post (“Stock Market Comment“) I mentioned, among other comments, that I believed the stock market, as a whole, is currently a bubble.

I would like to elaborate upon my reasoning for such, especially since it is a view (admittedly) held by very few.  What makes this stock market bubble particularly insidious is that by many outward appearances it doesn’t appear to be a bubble.  The most deadly bubbles are ones that don’t obviously appear as such.

I believe that the subject of bubbles, and determination of such, is a very complex, yet critically important subject.  As such, I have written extensively about them in the context of our present economic situation and their impact on future economic prosperity.

Perhaps adding to this complexity is that there really isn’t a concrete definition of what constitutes an asset bubble (or “speculative bubble”).

For many of these reasons, “spotting” and identifying bubbles – especially while they are  “in the making” – can prove difficult.  As I commented in my post of December 2, 2009:

“Some bubbles are harder to spot than others.  Bubbles, almost by definition, include irrational behavior, and therefore can be hard to predict both in their formation as well as their ultimate size.  There are many factors that can come into play in order to cause bubbles.”

I view the process of identification of bubbles into two components; fundamental analysis and technical analysis.  The fundamental case that the stock market is a bubble ranges from relatively simple to vastly complex;  as such, I will (at least for now) primarily focus on some of the technical analysis (and other price movement) issues that are of a more straightforward nature.

In my next post I will elaborate upon these factors…

 

A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here
SPX at 1328.68 as this post is written

 

Share

Stock Market Comment

Friday, February 11th, 2011

Starting with my June 2, 2010 post I wrote of my expectation for a near-term stock market advance despite what I viewed as highly problematical future conditions.  I continue to maintain this view, albeit with the dangers discussed in subsequent posts, including that of October 13, 2010 “Comments On The Next Crash.”

Although I continue to believe the stock market will go higher, there are many technical and fundamental signs that are disconcerting.  I will be discussing these in detail in the near future.

Another issue of great importance is whether the stock market, as a whole, is currently a bubble.  I believe that it is.  This is admittedly a very unique opinion.  I will discuss my reasoning in a future post.  This “bubble” condition will have immense future ramifications.

For reference purposes, below is a daily chart of the S&P500, from March 2, 2009, near the March 6, 2009 low of 666.79:

(click on chart to enlarge image)(chart courtesy of StockCharts.com)

_____

A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here

SPX at 1321.87 as this post is written

Share

What’s Ahead For The Housing Market – A Look At The Charts

Sunday, October 24th, 2010

There has been much written as to the future of residential real estate prices.  The consensus appears to be for very slight appreciation for years.  This consensus is echoed in the MacroMarkets September 2010 Home Price Expectations Survey Press Release (pdf).  Here is a chart from that survey that shows the past history (green line) as well as future expectation (red line):

click on chart to enlarge image

As one can see on this chart, real estate prices (here measured by the S&P/ Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index) really started their ascent in the mid-90′s.

Here is another chart, reflecting the CoreLogic House Price Index of July 2010.  The chart is courtesy the CalculatedRisk blog with annotations by John Lounsbury, as noted:

click on chart to enlarge image

In this chart it is again seen that the pronounced ascent in real estate prices began in the mid-90s.  As well, as seen by John’s annotations, the market has experienced a roughly 30% fall from its peak, and a price reversion to the trendline from January 1976 would represent a further 15% decline.

I have written extensively about various facets and dynamics of the residential real estate market.  My analysis indicates that this is a market that is exceedingly complex, due to a variety of hard-to-predict factors.  These factors include such issues as strategic default trends, “shadow inventories”, redefault rates, and the relatively new confusion concerning foreclosure propriety.  As well, there is immense direct and indirect government intervention in this market, which presents further complexities.

Assessing the future path of real estate prices can be done in a variety of fashions; as well, many different measures can be taken into account.  There are reams of data on a myriad of statistics.

For purposes of this post, I would like to focus on the price trends as shown in the two charts above and raise four issues with regard to the future of home prices.  Although I don’t necessarily agree with the methodologies employed by these indices,  they have common acceptance.

The first issue I would raise is whether trendlines can be used to assess the trends of house prices.  The issue is debatable.  Whereas trendlines have proven validity in stock price movements, I would question as to whether such validity exists with regard to home prices.

The second issue is whether such trendlines (assuming their use in housing trends is valid) will serve as “support.”  I would offer that if the housing market is in a continuation of its long-running bull market, the trendline would serve as support.  However, whether we are continuing a long-running bull market in housing is deeply contentious.  My own view on the matter is that the housing market peaked as shown and is now on a decline.  As such, a trendline would likely not hold as support.

The third issue is that of ultimate support; i.e. a price floor.  Some believe that the “pre-bubble” price levels would serve as such a floor.  For example, if one believed that the real estate bubble started in earnest in the mid-90′s, such a level would serve as the ultimate price floor.  This seems logical as, in theory, the price inflation during the bubble’s excesses would be eliminated if the price were to return to the pre-bubble price levels.  However, I think this is erroneous logic on many fronts.  From a “technical perspective” it fails to consider a “reversion to the mean” that would result in a “price undershoot” to a level significantly below that of the prices of the mid-90′s.

The fourth issue is one of “bubble dynamics.”  Of course, the almost universal belief is that the housing bubble has “popped.”  I don’t agree.  As I have previously written, I believe the roughly 30% decline experienced to date, although incredibly damaging, is a “deflation” of the huge bubble as opposed to its “popping.”  Further supporting this idea is that each index has only fallen to levels last seen during a latter year of the bubble, approximately the 2003 period.

This “deflation” vs. “popping” nomenclature is more than semantics.  If the bubble has only “deflated,” as I believe, then the “popping,” and its pronounced accompanying damage, still awaits.

Lastly, one should keep in mind how supportive (ultra) low interest rates have been to real estate prices.   While such low interest rates are widely believed to be stable for the foreseeable future, a substantial uptick in rates would likely prove a significant headwind against the possibility of rising prices.

In summary, while many people have an optimistic view regarding future residential real estate prices, in my opinion such a view is unsupported on an “all things considered” basis.  Furthermore, as discussed, there exists outsized potential for a substantial price decline, unfortunately.

A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here

SPX at 1183.08 as this post is written

Share