I have found comments made by former President George W. Bush to be interesting and notable, although I don’t agree with many of his comments or interpretations.  His interpretation of The Financial Crisis and its causes are largely “in line” with what I call the “conventional view” – i.e. that which is most commonly believed among economics and financial professionals.

In my November 29, 2010 post I highlighted some notable quotes from a George W. Bush interview concerning The Financial Crisis.

Recently, I read Chapter 14 of his Decision Points book, titled “Financial Crisis.”  While, from an overall viewpoint, nothing in this chapter is necessarily “new” or revelatory in nature, there are nonetheless various notable aspects.  Much of his writings in the chapter echo statements he made during The Financial Crisis, such as those seen in his September 28, 2008 “President’s Address to the Nation.”

Here are excerpts of some of the material I found most interesting:

On page 440, it starts with his conversation with Ben Bernanke during The Financial Crisis:

“Is this the worst crisis since the Great Depression?” I asked.

“Yes,” Ben replied.  ”In terms of the financial system, we have not seen anything like this since the 1930s, and it could get worse.”

His answer clarified the decision I faced:   Did I want to be the president overseeing an economic calamity that could be worse than the Great Depression?

I was furious the situation had reached this point.  A relatively small group of people – many on Wall Street, some not – had gambled that the housing market would keep booming forever.  It didn’t.  In a normal environment, the free market would render its judgment and they could fail.  I would have been happy to let them do so.

But this was not a normal environment.  The market had ceased to function.  And as Ben had explained, the consequences of inaction would be catastrophic.  As unfair as it was to use the American people’s money to prevent a collapse for which they weren’t responsible, it would be even more unfair to do nothing and leave them to suffer the consequences.

On page 449, he talks about the unforeseen risks proliferating during the housing bubble:

But the exuberance of the moment masked the underlying risk.  Together, the global pool of cash, easy monetary policy, booming housing market, insatiable appetite for mortgage-backed assets, complexity of Wall Street engineering, and leverage of financial institutions created a house of cards.  This precarious structure was fated to collapse as soon as the underlying card – the nonstop growth in housing prices – was pulled out.  That was clear in retrospect.  But very few saw it at the time, including me.

On page 453, he briefly discusses Moral Hazard issues, in the context of the decision regarding Bear Stearns:

My first instinct was not to save Bear.  In a a free market economy, firms that fail should go out of business.  If the government stepped in, we would create a problem known as moral hazard:  Other firms would assume they would be bailed out, too, which would embolden them to take more risks.

And, near the back of the chapter:

One of the questions I’m asked most often is how to avoid another financial crisis.  My first answer is that I’m not sure we’re out of the woods on this one yet….”

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The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 1341.33 as this post is written

From time to time I plan on commenting on various material contained therein as much of it is highly relevant to issues we are currently encountering.

His following comments are particularly noteworthy given today’s economic environment and intervention activities such as QE2:

First, in his “Free to Choose” book, Chapter 9, p. 266:

“…the Fed has given its heart not to controlling the quantity of money but to controlling interest rates, something that it does not have the power to do.”

In Volume 9 of his “Free to Choose” television series, Friedman makes a variety of interesting comments from roughly the 37:22 mark to 38:13.  At roughly 37:45 he makes a comment about ideas to “finance the deficit by printing money” and then at 37:57 makes this comment:

“The Federal Reserve’s activities in trying to hold down interest rates have put us in a position where we have the highest interest rates in history.  It’s another example of how – of the difference – between the announced intentions of a policy and the actual result.”

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The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 1297.54 as this post is written

Given the recent steep climb in the stock market, I think it is interesting to highlight his comments on the interaction between The Federal Reserve and the stock market.   While his entire thoughts on the issue are notable, I found his comment at the 16:24 mark to be, for a number of reasons, very provocative:

“…the stock market overall is the only type of stimulus that you can get in the economy which doesn’t have any debt associated with it.”

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I’ll likely further comment on this, as well as other recent comments made by Federal Reserve officials on the stock market, in a future post…

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A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here

SPX at 1339.26 as this post is written

One aspect that I would like to briefly comment upon is that of the success of QE2.   Quantitative Easing’s primary goal is to lower interest rates.  However, during QE1 and (to date) QE2, interest rates have risen, not declined, since the program was begun.  This is highly important and notable, yet doesn’t receive proper recognition.  It begs the question as to whether QE1 and QE2 are failed interventions.

Proponents of QE2 claim that it is “working” or is “effective” as the stock market is rising, GDP is rising, or use a variety of other arguments to justify the program.  However, that does nothing to change the fact that interest rates have risen, not declined, under QE2 (and QE1).

This passage from yesterday’s speech is notable with regard to the above:

“Yields on 5- to 10-year Treasury securities initially declined markedly as markets priced in prospective Fed purchases; these yields subsequently rose, however, as investors became more optimistic about economic growth and as traders scaled back their expectations of future securities purchases. All of these developments are what one would expect to see when monetary policy becomes more accommodative, whether through conventional or less conventional means. Interestingly, these developments are also remarkably similar to those that occurred during the earlier episode of policy easing, notably in the months following our March 2009 announcement of a significant expansion in securities purchases. The fact that financial markets responded in very similar ways to each of these policy actions lends credence to the view that these actions had the expected effects on markets and are thereby providing significant support to job creation and the economy.”

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A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here

SPX at 1307.10 as this post is written

Over the last few months the discussions over the exit strategy seem to have diminished greatly – despite the start of QE2 and speculation of additional QE programs, i.e. QE3, QE4, etc.

I have discussed the various risks of Quantitative Easing in several posts.  As I stated in the August 13 post, “There are an array of risks embedded in such QE efforts.”  These risks, although very substantial, seem to (severely) lack recognition.

The (eventual) exit of Quantitative Easing is one of these risks.  This is a very complex topic of which much can be written.

While I believe it to be rather incontrovertible that The Federal Reserve does have the knowledge and tools to exit such QE programs, that is not to say that doing such will be without complications, adverse unforeseen consequences, or market disruptions.

While it is possible that the eventual exit from QE will go smoothly, I think that the possibility of adversity in doing so is high.  There is much that can go wrong in “a big way” on numerous fronts – especially if an exit is done under exigent circumstances.  As well, there are many conflicting incentives inherent in Quantitative Easing, which further complicates the “exit” issue.

One item that is particularly disconcerting is the potential for capital losses on the Fed’s growing balance sheet.  I’ve already commented about this in the November 5 post.  In a December 2 Cumberland Advisors commentary titled “Fed Exit Strategies – Technical Analysis” (pdf), there are some notable statistics on this subject in their commentary on the exit issue.

It should be very interesting to monitor this QE exit as it occurs…

A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here

SPX at 1236.63 as this post is written

“Bernanke is someone who talks about returns without talking about risk.  It’s identical to a pilot who talks about speed but not about safety.  The measures he is using may work, but should they fail, the risks are humongous.”

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A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here

SPX at 1187.76 as this post is written

I found various comments by George W. Bush to be interesting.  In many instances I disagree with what he said.  For now, I will briefly highlight a few items and may extensively comment about this interview later.

Particularly notable is George W. Bush’s comments about TARP, interventions, and government involvement.

However, two of his phrases really stand out above all others.  I find them of the utmost importance.  The first is:

“I had to abandon free market principles in order to save the free market system.”

The second is (with regard to the need for action during the Financial Crisis):

“…there’s not a lot of time for theoretical debate.”

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A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here

SPX at 1189.40 as this post is written

On November 12, Macroeconomic Advisers had a blog post from Larry Meyer that discussed monetary policy (focused on QE2) and the U.S. Dollar.  While I don’t agree with various parts of this blog post, I nonetheless think it is noteworthy to see what a (very) prominent economic consulting firm has to say on the issue.

Here are some excerpts from that November 12 post:

How does the exchange rate affect monetary policy? How will the foreign backlash affect monetary policy going forward?

• We have not changed our firmly-held view that the FOMC has no dollar policy; it has no target for the dollar, just as it has no target for equity valuations. Dollar policy is the realm of the Treasury. The foreign backlash will not dissuade the Committee from pursuing what it sees as appropriate policy.
• For the most part, the dollar has two roles with respect to monetary policy: First, it is part of the transmission mechanism, part of how monetary policy affects the economy. Second, to the extent that the dollar moves independently of monetary policy, it is like any other variable: The FOMC takes actual and projected changes in exchange rates into account in its forecast and responds accordingly.
• There are two circumstances (discussed below) under which the dollar would take more of a center stage in FOMC deliberations: (i) a “free fall” in the dollar and (ii) a tighter and more intense link between the dollar and commodity prices in a context of a faster pass-through from commodity prices to long-term inflation expectations and core inflation.

also:

Does the FOMC ever worry about the dollar? Yes, under two circumstances:

• A Dollar Collapse: If the dollar were to go into “free fall” (we will know it when we see it), the FOMC would face an enormous challenge because that would be catastrophic for the U.S. and foreign economies alike. There would be chaos in financial markets around the world. This is a nightmare scenario for the Fed, but a tail risk. Here, we expect that the FOMC would have to be part of the policy response to stabilize the dollar. Free fall, however, is much more likely as a result of continued fiscal irresponsibility in the U.S.
• The Dollar-Commodities-Inflation Nexus: The FOMC likely worries about the recent seemingly more intense relationship between the dollar and commodity prices. The consequences depend on the degree to which commodity prices are passed through to core inflation. In any case, a sharp and persistent rise in commodity prices could raise concern about an unhinging of long-term inflation expectations, which, in turn, could affect monetary policy. Today, however, the main driver of rising commodity prices, we believe, is supply and demand, especially soaring demand by Asian economies.

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A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here

SPX at 1199.21 as this post is written

I found these comments, pertaining to QE2, to be highly notable:

Ben Bernanke:

“There is not really, in my mind, as much discontinuity as people think.  This sense out there, that quantitative easing or asset purchases, is some completely far removed, strange kind of thing and we have no idea what the hell is going to happen, and it’s just an unanticipated, unpredictable policy – quite the contrary.  This is just monetary policy.”

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A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here

SPX at 1213.40 as this post is written

I could write very extensively about this piece as it is highly notable on several fronts.  For now, I will limit my comments.

My analysis indicates that the risks of QE lack recognition.  As well, the benefits appear highly overstated.  As such, we (as a nation) appear to have a mistaken understanding of the risk-reward ratio of large-scale QE.  This is especially problematical as I expect additional large-scale QE will be done in the future.  This belief is echoed by other prominent parties.

What I find interesting about Bernanke’s (and other Fed members’) comments about QE is that they seem very limited in discussing risks of QE.  This begs the question as to whether Fed members don’t think there is much risk in QE.  From what I have seen, the main risk Fed members have discussed is money supply issues / future inflation as well as the ability to gracefully (i.e. non-disruptively) exit such QE efforts.  Bernanke briefly mentions both of these items in his above-mentioned Washington Post op-ed.

However, I view those risks as being only two among a multitude of others.  As I wrote in the August 13 post, “There are an array of risks embedded in such QE efforts.”  In that post I discuss QE risks to the U.S. Dollar and QE’s role in fostering asset bubbles.

Another risk that receives little recognition is the risks embedded in the ever-increasing size of the Fed’s portfolio.   This is a very complex potential risk, entailing both large potential capital losses (driven in large part by rising interest rates) as well as other unintended (negative) consequences.  The potential capital losses aspect is well-documented in a Wall Street Journal editorial of today titled “High Rollers at the Fed.”

Both of these risks, as well as the multitude others, will only grow in importance if, as I suspect, additional (over and above Wednesday’s $600B announcement) large QE is performed in the future.

A Special Note concerning our economic situation is found here

SPX at 1222.43 as this post is written