Posts Tagged ‘Intervention’

The Effectiveness Of Stimulus

Wednesday, February 24th, 2010

“One of the biggest economic myths since the Great Depression is that governments can ameliorate or counteract the ebbs and flows of free markets. Government spending has never worked as a trigger for sustained and vibrant economic growth. Ever. Scholarship has demonstrated that the New Deal perpetuated the Depression rather than cured it. On the eve of the Depression the U.S. had the lowest unemployment rate among developed nations. But a decade later, despite six years of FDR’s New Deal, our unemployment rate was one of the highest among developed economies. Japan’s serial stimulus programs over the past two decades have repeatedly underscored this truth.”

Steve Forbes, Forbes Magazine, March 1 2010 p. 11 (link found here)

______

I have written extensively about interventions, which includes stimulus spending.   Stimulus spending and interventions are widely (and wildly) misunderstood.

I think it is very important to have a full understanding of how the ARRA, a  very large stimulus, is performing.   As I wrote in a July 9 2009 blog post in which I discussed the ARRA, “Even if one were unabashedly pro-stimulus, one would find some serious faults with the $787 Billion stimulus plan, as enacted.”  As such, it should be of little surprise that the ARRA has been, at best, such a poor performer when analyzed in a variety of manners.

Here is a recent article from Alan Reynolds concerning the effectiveness of the ARRA.   Although I don’t necessarily agree with some of his conclusions, he does present some interesting statistics and views with regard to how the ARRA has performed.

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SIGTARP Comments

Thursday, February 4th, 2010

I found some interesting comments in the SIGTARP January 30 2010 Report to Congress:

http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/January2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf

From the Executive Summary, which begins on Page 5:

“Many of TARP’s stated goals, however, have simply not been met. Despite the fact that the explicit goal of the Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”) was to increase financing to U.S. businesses and consumers, lending continues to decrease, month after month, and the TARP program designed specifically to address small-business lending — announced in March 2009 — has still not been implemented by Treasury. Notwithstanding the fact that preserving homeownership and promoting jobs were explicit purposes of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”), the statute that created TARP, nearly 16 months later, home foreclosures remain at record levels, the TARP foreclosure prevention program has only permanently modified a small fraction of eligible mortgages, and unemployment is
the highest it has been in a generation. Whether these goals can effectively be met through existing TARP programs is very much an open question at this time. And to the extent that the Government had leverage through its status as a significant preferred shareholder to influence the largest TARP recipients to carry out such policy goals, it was lost with their exit from TARP.”

also:

“….The substantial costs of TARP — in money, moral hazard effects on the market, and Government credibility — will have been for naught if we do nothing to correct the fundamental problems in our financial system and end up in a similar or even greater crisis in two, or five, or ten years’ time.  It is hard to see how any of the fundamental problems in the system have been addressed to date.

• To the extent that huge, interconnected, “too big to fail” institutions contributed to the crisis, those institutions are now even larger, in part because of the substantial subsidies provided by TARP and other bailout programs.

• To the extent that institutions were previously incentivized to take reckless risks through a “heads, I win; tails, the Government will bail me out” mentality, the market is more convinced than ever that the Government will step in as necessary to save systemically significant institutions. This perception was reinforced when TARP was extended until October 3, 2010, thus permitting Treasury to maintain a war chest of potential rescue funding at the same time that banks that have shown questionable ability to return to profitability (and in some cases are posting multi-billion-dollar losses) are exiting TARP programs.

• To the extent that large institutions’ risky behavior resulted from the desire to justify ever-greater bonuses — and indeed, the race appears to be on for TARP recipients to exit the program in order to avoid its pay restrictions — the current bonus season demonstrates that although there have been some improvements in the form that bonus compensation takes for some executives, there has been little fundamental change in the excessive compensation culture on Wall Street.

• To the extent that the crisis was fueled by a “bubble” in the housing market, the Federal Government’s concerted efforts to support home prices — as discussed more fully in Section 3 of this report — risk re-inflating that bubble in light of the Government’s effective takeover of the housing market through purchases and guarantees, either direct or implicit, of nearly all of the residential mortgage market.

Stated another way, even if TARP saved our financial system from driving off a cliff back in 2008, absent meaningful reform, we are still driving on the same winding mountain road, but this time in a faster car.”

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Characteristics Of The Housing Bubble

Friday, January 8th, 2010

Given the incredibly outsized intervention efforts in the residential real estate market, I think it is important to examine some dynamics of the real estate bubble.

Here is a chart from the 12/15/09 Contrary Investor commentary that I believe is interesting, as it depicts some underlying residential real estate fundamentals.  It shows the equity and mortgage debt situation.  The underlying data is from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds:

http://www.contraryinvestor.com/

As far as real estate prices are concerned, I would like to show two charts, both from the CalculatedRisk blog:

http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/

The first chart was posted on 12/21/09 and is the LoanPerformance Price Index from 1976:

Next, a chart posted on 12/29/09 showing the LoanPerformance Index as well as Case-Shiller, from January 2000:

As others have commented, it appears as if the overall intervention efforts are aimed at reflating (or to re-inflate) the housing bubble.  Conventional (investment) wisdom has held that reflating a burst bubble is impossible.

However, I think given the tremendously outsized intervention efforts in housing, we are truly in a unique situation.  I don’t believe there has ever been such a large intervention effort in our country, at least in the last 150 years.  Depending upon how one would measure such intervention efforts, it might even be among the largest interventions in world economic history.

A casual observer might assume that such an outsized effort would be destined to be successful.  However, (economic) life is not that simple.

From an ”all things considered” standpoint, I don’t believe the residential real estate bubble has actually burst.  It appears to me that it has somewhat deflated.  I base this view on a variety of fundamental and technical factors. 

Assuming this view is correct – that the residential real estate hasn’t popped – the implications are immense.   I think it is likely that one of two possibilities will occur from here, and each could happen in a relatively rapid fashion.  The first possibility is a “successful” reflation of the residential real estate market, with accompanying economic activity.  The second possibility is a collapse of the residential real estate market with accompanying economic repercussions.  As to the path real estate will travel from here - my previous writings on interventions, bubbles and real estate indicate my thoughts on the subject.

If a “successful” relation occurs, one is led to wonder as to the characteristics of such a “successful” reflation of the real estate bubble.  Among other critical questions is how long would such a reflation last?

I think it very important to note the quality and durability of the economic activity that occurred in the first phase of the bubble, which peaked in 2006.  Can one hope for any better outcome during a subsequent reflation?

These issues are critical to the concept of Sustainable Prosperity, of which I have previously frequently commented.

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SPX at 1137.37 as this post is written

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More On The Fannie/Freddie Developments Of December 24

Thursday, January 7th, 2010

Here is a Wall Street Journal editorial on the December 24 developments at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  This editorial provides some new perspectives on the matter:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704152804574628350980043082.html

My original comments on these developments was on December 28.

I feel it is critically important to understand the extent of intervention as it pertains to the housing market.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continue to play an very large role in these intervention efforts. 

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SPX at 1135.43 as this post is written

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Ron Paul – “Be Prepared for the Worst”

Thursday, November 12th, 2009

I would like to comment on a commentary by Ron Paul in the November 16 edition of Forbes.  It is titled “Be Prepared for the Worst” and subtitled “The large-scale government intervention in the economy is going to end badly.”

The commentary can be found at this link:

http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/1116/opinions-great-depression-economy-on-my-mind_print.html

While I don’t agree with everything that Ron Paul says, I did find this commentary to be very interesting and well worth reading.  Here are some excerpts that I found particularly noteworthy: 

“A false recovery is under way.”

also:

“This is nothing less than the creation of another bubble. By attempting to cushion the economy from the worst shocks of the housing bubble’s collapse, the Federal Reserve has ensured that the ultimate correction of its flawed economic policies will be more severe than it otherwise would have been.”

also:

“What is more likely happening is a repeat of the Great Depression. We might have up to a year or so of an economy growing just slightly above stagnation, followed by a drop in growth worse than anything we have seen in the past two years.”

 

SPX at 1095.85 as this post is written

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The Hyperinflation Theme

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

One of the more prevalent themes mentioned has been the possibility, or probability, of hyperinflation.  Hyperinflation is often mentioned due to the degree of “money pumping” and other intervention measures that have occurred in the last two years to combat this period of economic weakness.

However, despite all of the predictions of hyperinflation, there appears to be no signs of it.  One would think that if a hyperinflationary environment were present, gold would be a strong performer.  However, gold is currently near $945, a level near the upper range of its movements since 2008.

Of course, hyperinflation can still yet occur, but so far no manifestations appear evident. 

 

SPX at 996.36 as this post is written

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My Thoughts on More Stimulus, Part III

Thursday, July 9th, 2009

This post will focus on the $787 Billion stimulus.

As mentioned in the last post, there are varying perceptions as to its effect-to-date.

I would like to go back to earlier this year, before the stimulus was enacted. I would like to briefly discuss the plan at that point, as it, as well as the analysis that accompanied it, ostensibly represented (at the time) our national understanding of the economic situation, as well as the solution.

A report was published on 1/9/09 titled “Job Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan,” commonly called the “Romer and Bernstein” report.  At the time, I found the report to be very unconvincing with regard to support of the proposed stimulus action.  The analysis, in my opinion, was very tenuous.

Even if one were unabashedly pro-stimulus, one would find some serious faults with the $787 Billion stimulus plan, as enacted.  Perhaps the biggest problem is that it is relatively slow to disburse funds.  If it were “front-loaded” it would be delivering funds at a much greater pace – and presumably be more helpful to the economy now, not later. 

There is another issue that this slow disbursement causes – that of measuring the effectiveness of the stimulus.  At this point, the stimulus is plainly lacking in effectiveness vs. plan, as measured by the unemployment rate.  However, some supporters of the stimulus are quick to point out that only a fraction of the funds have been disbursed; therefore, it is too early to assess the viability of the stimulus plan, as its benefits have largely yet to be realized.   Thus, a question forms:  is the stimulus ineffective, or will it just take longer to attain the benefits?   This question creates a conundrum in the following sense:  if the stimulus is ineffective, presumably (according to stimulus proponents) we should then quickly do more stimulus; however, if the existing $787 Billion stimulus has yet to largely “kick in”, then it would be premature to do additional stimulus.  Another conundrum can then be seen:  if we now assume that the $787 billion stimulus will work with time, but are later proven wrong, from a pro-stimulus viewpoint we will have wasted both time, and the ability to proactively stem further economic decline because we have passed on the current opportunity to do additional stimulus.  Thus, as one can see, this timing of the benefit issue has created a difficult and tricky situation, especially for those who are stimulus proponents.

Other problems I have found with the $787 billion stimulus (again, assuming the stimulus should be done) is that much of the theory and practicality of the stimulus is flawed; and the “pork” is very objectionable in both size and (lack of) quality.

Ostensibly, this $787 Billion stimulus represented a “best effort” attempt to improve our economic situation.  If one is of the opinion it is not working, or not working as planned, is it not working because it is poorly designed, or because the inherent concept of stimulus holds little or no validity?

For those that have not seen it, I wrote an article titled “Intervention’s Potential Blind Spots” as I believe that various facets of intervention (including stimulus efforts) deserve further attention.  It can be found here (under the Articles heading):

http://www.economicgreenfield.com/prosperitybypencom-directory/

SPX at 884.88 as this post is written

 

Copyright 2009 by Ted Kavadas

 

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My Thoughts on More Stimulus, Part II

Wednesday, July 8th, 2009

Perhaps one of the first questions that should be asked with regard to our current economic difficulties is “Do we Understand the Problem?”  I discussed this concept in the article “President Obama’s Greatest Challenge” (listed here as the fourth article):

http://www.economicgreenfield.com/prosperitybypencom-directory/

Do we understand the problem?  I will leave that question unanswered, for now.  However, some aspects to consider:

  1. We seem to continually underestimate the complexity and/or severity of our economic situation in that each stimulus is billed as the “solution” to our problems, yet each fails to stem further economic weakness.   This problem has occurred with the $150 billion tax rebate stimulus in 2008; TARP in 2008, and now, based upon results vs. plan (to date), The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
  2. As mentioned in yesterday’s post, “An Interesting Chart on Job Losses,” the length and severity of this purported recession are outsized, on a historical basis, despite the very large aggregate intervention steps taken.
  3. There is widely varying conclusions as to the effect of the $787 Billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.  As mentioned in this Wall Street Journal article (which does a good job of summarizing the current calls for more stimulus): 
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124692229711302683.html ”Depending on your perspective, the stimulus plan:
    a. Isn’t working.
    b. Is preventing unemployment from being even worse, or
    c. Hasn’t had enough time to really kick in yet.”
  4. The rather disconcerting reality that despite official large-scale interventions (including stimulus plans) since at least mid-2007, the economy is, at best, not getting any worse.  But as mentioned in the following Wall Street Journal editorial,

    “The real question is how strong and sustained any expansion will be. If the “stimulus” were working as advertised, it ought to be very strong.”

  5. Add to this list an array of disturbing economic statistics and other “outlier” behavior that I have previously discussed. 

As listed above, as well as for other reasons, there is much to consider when one attempts to answer the question “Do we understand the problem?” 

Part III to follow…

SPX at 880.38 as this post is written

 

Copyright 2009 by Ted Kavadas

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An Interesting Chart on Job Losses

Tuesday, July 7th, 2009

I ran across the following chart from chartoftheday.com, and found it interesting:

http://www.chartoftheday.com/20090703.htm?T

As one can see, the current degree of job losses is rather atypical.

I would also like to highlight another issue as well.  From a historical perspective, this (purported) recession, that the NBER has classified as having started in December 2007, is getting “long in the tooth” from a historical perspective.  The following blog post does a good job of summarizing how long recessions typically last:

http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/06/update-what-is-depression.html

As one can see, from a historical standpoint the severity of the job losses, as well as the length of this (purported) recession are atypical.  Both have persevered in the face of very large amounts of intervention, including stimulus efforts.   

As I have written about previously, the above is yet more evidence that we may well be in a “new (economic) environment” – with the associated implications…   

SPX at 883.05 as this post is written

 

Copyright 2009 by Ted Kavadas

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Article of Note on the Foreclosure Crisis

Monday, July 6th, 2009

I found the following article to be of interest.  It is titled “New Evidence on the Foreclosure Crisis” and is found in The Wall Street Journal, p A13, July 3-5, at this link:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124657539489189043.html

While I can’t verify his analysis, the article is worth reading.

I don’t agree with all of his conclusions, especially his remark that housing prices are likely to stop declining soon.  

However, his analysis and other conclusions are important in that they further support the idea that many of the policy efforts currently enacted to mitigate the foreclosure problem may be misdirected.  

It is important to remember that much of the total intervention effort is aimed toward averting further weakness in residential real estate.

SPX at 888.65 as this post is written

 

Copyright 2009 by Ted Kavadas

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