Archive for August, 2009

Median Duration of Unemployment

Monday, August 17th, 2009

I think the following chart is one that surely deserves attention:

(click on chart image to enlarge)

UEMPMED_St Louis Fed 8-16-09

Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve

It shows the Median Duration of Unemployment.  One notices the trajectory of the chart during our current period of economic weakness.

Although I have reservations as to how the data on this chart is derived, I do think it is important to monitor this chart on an ongoing basis.

This chart seems to further validate the assertion I have made before on this blog – that we are in a new (economic) environment.

SPX at 1004.09 as this post is written

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New Article: “America’s Trojan Horse”

Friday, August 14th, 2009

I just posted a new article titled “America’s Trojan Horse.”  The subtitle is “A Different Look At The National Debt.”  It can be found under the “Pages” section along the right-hand side, as well as at this link:

http://www.economicgreenfield.com/americas-trojan-horse/

The article goes well with many of the themes presented on this blog, including Sustainable Prosperity, America’s Economic Future, and the overall quality of decision making in policy.

Please let me know of any comments.

SPX at 1002.26 as this post is written

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Double-Digit Revenue Declines

Thursday, August 13th, 2009

The August 17 edition of Business Week, p19 had a column titled “A Record Revenue Decline.”  It can be found here at the bottom of the page:

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_33/c4143btw375952.htm?chan=magazine+channel_the+business+week

This line is especially noteworthy: “This marks the first time since S&P started tracking quarterly revenues (in 1993) that revenues dipped 10% or more for three quarters in a row.”

Although the idea of lumping all S&P500 revenues together is perhaps not an optimal way to look at this situation, it still would seem to indicate that the situation with regard to falling revenues is very significant.

As I have commented previously, companies experiencing double-digit revenue declines make for a very challenging and stressful environment, especially as these double-digit declines continue each quarter.

SPX at 1003.52 as this post is written

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Debunking A Popular Phrase

Wednesday, August 12th, 2009

One of the phrases that I have heard innumerable times is that our current period of economic weakness “isn’t as bad as The Great Depression because during The Great Depression unemployment was at 25%.”

While I have commented repeatedly on this blog that I don’t believe we should be equating our current economic condition to that of The Great Depression, I would like to comment on the phrase above.

As one can see on the chart found in this The Economist article:

http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13856176

the unemployment rate during The Great Depression peaked at 25%.  Also of note is the steady yet unrelenting climb in the rate leading to this peak.

Another issue that would need to be factored into any discussion of the two periods’ unemployment rates is that of comparibility.  While I haven’t seen any well-documented analysis of the methods used during each period, the prevailing wisdom appears to be that our current unemployment rate is understated vs. that used during The Great Depression. 

As I have stated previously on this blog, (on the “Why Aren’t Companies Hiring?” series that started on July 24) ”The unemployment issue currently facing the country is severe and complex.”  It is important that we keep it in proper historical context.

SPX at 1005.73 as this post is written

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The Hyperinflation Theme

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

One of the more prevalent themes mentioned has been the possibility, or probability, of hyperinflation.  Hyperinflation is often mentioned due to the degree of “money pumping” and other intervention measures that have occurred in the last two years to combat this period of economic weakness.

However, despite all of the predictions of hyperinflation, there appears to be no signs of it.  One would think that if a hyperinflationary environment were present, gold would be a strong performer.  However, gold is currently near $945, a level near the upper range of its movements since 2008.

Of course, hyperinflation can still yet occur, but so far no manifestations appear evident. 

 

SPX at 996.36 as this post is written

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Martin Feldstein’s “Underwater” Mortgage Plan – My Comments

Monday, August 10th, 2009

In the Saturday edition of The Wall Street Journal, there is an op-ed from Martin Feldstein titled “How to Save an ‘Underwater’ Mortgage.”

The editorial provides a good summary of the numbers behind “Underwater” mortgages.  Also, I think the article is beneficial in that it highlights the problem of mortgage defaults and foreclosures, and how “Underwater” mortgages can exacerbate the default/foreclosure crisis.

As the editorial progresses, Martin Feldstein lays out a plan for curtailing the potential problem presented by these ’underwater’ mortgates.

It is concerning this plan that I would like to comment.  I’ll keep the comments to a minimum, as this “underwater” mortgage situation and what to do about it is one that I could write very extensively about…

First, this proposal would entail (yet) another intervention, and as such is subject to the potential risks and unintended consequences of interventions, of which I have previously written.

With regard to this specific proposal ~

One of the problems I see with Martin Feldstein’s plan, and one which recurs frequently with all the bailouts, is that it helps those that, at least by the stated loan-to-value metric, have acted most in error.  Some may use the term “have acted most irresponsibly.”  In the case of these underwater mortgages, Feldstein proposes to have a certain amount of each mortgage reduced for those who have loan-to-value ratios of over 120%.  This is a major issue in that it calls into question the aspect of fairness, a factor I have previously written about.

Another problem I see with the proposal is that it it appears to inherently assume that the current population of 120%+ loan-to-value ratio homeowners is static.  If residential real estate were to decline further, this population would likely increase, perhaps substantially.  In fact, in such a falling residential real estate scenario, a homeowner could have his mortgage rate reduced to 120% loan-to-value and then return above this level quite easily.

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As I wrote in a June 4 post:

“Solving” our residential real estate problems is going to be most difficult, in my opinion….”

SPX at 1010.48 as this post is written

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The FDIC Situation

Friday, August 7th, 2009

Ever so often I come across a story concerning the FDIC and its wherewithal to be able to cover its potential commitments.

It appears to be exceedingly thinly funded in relation to potential liabilities.  This may not be a big issue going forward if the economy improves; however, it could become a very large issue if the economy deteriorates from here.

While there is little doubt that the government would lend additional funds to the FDIC, if needed, it is one more item that could serve to significantly bolster the nation’s level of indebtedness.

One is led to wonder how purchasers of U.S. debt view the rising level of indebtedness, as well as the potential for all of the various federal “guarantees” of assets to add to the debt level.

 

SPX at 997.08 as this post is written

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“Underwater” Mortgages and “Strategic” Defaults

Thursday, August 6th, 2009

This article caught my interest; it is titled “About half of U.S. mortgages seen underwater by 2011″:

http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSN0526831020090805

Apparently their projections for “underwater” mortgages is based upon their forecast quoted in the article: “Covering 100 U.S. metropolitan areas, Deutsche Bank in June forecast home prices would fall 14 percent through the first quarter of 2011, for a total drop of 41.7 percent.”

While I haven’t spent the time to really develop an in-depth projection of my own as to where the “bottom” will be in residential real estate, I do believe it will be far lower than an additional 14% decline, for a variety of reasons.  If this becomes the case, the “underwater” aspect quoted in the article would presumably be exacerbated.

The Deutsche Bank forecasts mentioned in the article can also be read in conjunction with some other interesting research recently published with regard to ”strategic” defaults, which was mentioned in this Economist article from 6/25/09:

http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13905502

This “strategic defaults” issue is important and bears close monitoring going forward, especially if more mortgages go “underwater.”

SPX at 997.08 as this post is written

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Coming Soon – “Cash for Sneakers”?

Thursday, August 6th, 2009

Perhaps some have seen a recent Wall Street Journal editorial that commented on the economics and logic of the “Cash for Clunkers” program; it is subtitled “Let’s have a $4,500 subsidy for everything” and can be found here:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204313604574326531645819464.html

In one of the articles I have written, titled “Intervention’s Potential Blindspots” which is listed halfway down the page found here:

http://www.economicgreenfield.com/prosperitybypencom-directory/

I wrote the following concerning stimulus and intervention programs (point #8):

Setting of precedents –  Originally the bailouts were directed toward major banks and brokers under the pretense of having to protect the integrity of the overall financial system.  However, as time has gone on, the recipients of aid has expanded into other areas.  As the list of recipients widens, so does the rationale for providing more aid…as does the list of those expecting aid.  Thus a vicious circle arises.   If taken to extremes, basically any business or economic entity could claim duress because of poor economic conditions, and thus need – as well as claim entitlement for – aid.  Some of the current arguments for providing intervention are exceedingly convoluted and weak.  Despite these shortcomings, they are being given credence (and in many cases funding), thereby establishing a weak argumentative standard that can be copied and exploited by other parties.    The mere fact that certain of the arguments are so fatuous relatively early in the “entitlement” cycle bodes very poorly, signaling that by the aforementioned vicious cycle effect the entitlements “spectrum” may prove to be very wide.

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Unfortunately, the entitlements spectrum is “widening” as time goes on, as mentioned in my article.  Which leads one to wonder how, or if, the stimulus entitlements spectrum will be limited. 

Recently I saw the phrase “Cash for Sneakers” mentioned ~

 
SPX at 999.69 as this post is written
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Another Underexplored Facet of Stimulus Programs

Wednesday, August 5th, 2009

One of the criticisms I have read of the “Cash for Clunkers” stimulus is that the program is poorly administered.

It seems disconcerting that such a seemingly simplistic program like the “Cash for Clunkers” program is poorly administered.  One is led to wonder how more complex programs will be managed.

The effectiveness, and efficiency of how stimulus is administered is very important yet rarely discussed.

SPX at 998.59 as this post is written

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